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I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is an increasingly growing tension between the United States 
(U.S.) and the European Union (EU) related to personal data.  Businesses 
of all sizes both actively and passively transfer data across multiple 
borders on a daily basis.  In fact, it feels challenging to avoid crossing 
over borders in interactions with customers, suppliers, and consumers.  
The increasing reliance on the free flows of data across the globe for 
businesses across all industries does not fit squarely within the 
framework of data privacy and security regulations that apply within set 
jurisdictions and boundaries.  
Within an already complex regulatory environment, courts and 
legislatures are grappling with the tensions of the free flow of data and 
how to apply their laws while respecting the inherently global nature of 
the digital economy and the sovereignty of third-country legal systems.  
Within this backdrop, the EU, with its adoption of the General Data 
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Protection Regulation (GDPR), continues to drive global privacy 
initiatives with its robust privacy protections and enforcement, 
including the impact of cross-border data transfer of personal data.  But 
its approach to privacy and the regulation of data protection do not 
always align with the U.S. approach to these domains.  
In 2017, the combined Gross Domestic Product of the EU and the 
U.S. equated to approximately thirty-two percent (32%) of the global 
Gross Domestic Product.1  With their combined economic weight, the 
privacy tensions between the EU and the U.S. dominate the global 
discussion and demand that the two regions develop a solution to 
address these continued privacy concerns.  This Article provides an 
overview of the EU and U.S.’s legal jousting to the continued 
cross-border data transfers between these two regions, focusing on the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’s (ECJ) decision in Schrems II to 
highlight the challenges going forward with regional data protection 
laws and global data transfers.  
Part II will detail the cross-border data transfer requirements 
under the GDPR, focusing on the evolving agreements between the EU 
and the U.S. to attempt to create effective cross-border data transfer 
mechanisms between these two regions.  Part III explores the ECJ’s 
decision in Schrems II, providing insight into the continued criticism that 
the EU lodges against U.S. surveillance law.  Part IV details the response 
to Schrems II in both the EU and U.S.  Finally, Part V highlights challenges 
in applying the ECJ’s decision to the real-world digital economy.  
II.  CROSS-BORDER PERSONAL DATA TRANSFERS UNDER THE GDPR 
The GDPR provides for a number of mechanisms to transfer data 
out of the EU to a third country.2  All permissible mechanisms must be 
applied “in order to ensure that the level of protection of natural persons 
guaranteed by this Regulation is not undermined.”3  Two specific 
mechanisms under the GDPR for the transfer of personal data from the 
 
 1 The 2017 Results of the International Comparison Program, EUROSTAT (May 19, 
2020), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/10868691/2-19052020-
BP-EN.pdf.  
 2 Commission Regulation 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural 
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), ch. 
V., 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=
CELEX:32016R0679&from=EN#d1e4227-1-1. 
 3 Id. at art. 44. 
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EU to the U.S. are relevant to Schrems II: first, the use of Standard 
Contractual Clauses (SCCs);4 and second, an adequacy decision.5 
The GDPR permits the transfer of personal data “only if the 
controller or processor has provided appropriate safeguards, and on 
condition that enforceable data subject rights and effective legal 
remedies for data subjects are available.”6  One of the recognized 
“appropriate safeguards” is “standard data protection clauses adopted 
by the Commission in accordance with the examination procedure 
referred to in Article 93(2).”7  At issue in Schrems II was Decision 
20110/87/EU,8 whereby the EU Commission adopted the use of the 
SCCs for the transfer of personal data from an EU-based Controller to a 
non-EU-based Processor.  
Second, under the GDPR, the EU Commission has the authority to 
adopt an “adequacy decision,” thereby finding that “the third country, a 
territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country, or 
the international organisation in question ensures an adequate level of 
protection.”9  The factors that should be considered include “how a 
particular third country respects the rule of law, access to justice as well 
as international human rights norms and standards and its general and 
sectoral law, including legislation concerning public security, defence 
and national security as well as public order and criminal law.”10 
A.  The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Provisions 
On July 26, 2000, the EU Commission adopted opinion 
2000/520/EC11 creating the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Provisions for the 
transfer of personal data between the EU and the U.S.  At that time, EU 
 
 4 Id. at art. 46(2)(c). 
 5 Id. at art. 45. 
 6 Id. at art. 46(1).  
 7 Id. at art. 46(2)(c).  
 8 See Commission Decision of 5 February 2010 on Standard Contractual Clauses for 
the Transfer of Personal Data to Processors Established in Third Countries Under 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2010 O.J. (L 39) 5, 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32010D0087&
from=en. 
 9 GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 45(1). 
 10 Id. at Recital 104. 
 11 Commission Decision (EC) No. 2000/520 of 26 July 2000, Pursuant to Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the 
Protection Provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently 
Asked Questions Issued by the US Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215), 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32000D0520&
from=en [hereinafter Decision 2000/520]. 
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data protection operated under Directive 95/46/EC,12 the precursor to 
the GDPR.  Much like the GDPR, the Directive provided that personal 
data could be transferred to a third country if that third country 
“ensures an adequate level of protection and the Member State laws 
implementing other provisions of the Directive are respected prior to 
the transfer.”13  
Under its July 2000 Decision, the EU Commission held that 
companies who comply with the safe harbor privacy principles, publicly 
display their privacy policies, and are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) would be deemed to provide adequate 
protection for personal data transferred from the EU to the U.S.14  For 
the next fifteen years, the Safe Harbor Provisions remained a valid 
mechanism for companies to transfer personal data between the EU and 
the U.S. 
On October 6, 2015, the ECJ held that the Safe Harbor Provisions 
were not valid for the transfer of personal data.15  In support of this 
invalidation, in the Schrems I16 decision, the ECJ found that: 
“national security, public interest, or law enforcement 
requirements” have primacy over the safe harbour principles, 
primacy pursuant to which self-certified United States 
organisations receiving personal data from the European 
Union are bound to disregard those principles without 
limitation where they conflict with those requirements and 
therefore prove incompatible with them.17   
This derogation from the principles of privacy did not include any limit 
to U.S. interference with personal data transferred to the U.S. or “the 
existence of effective legal protection against interference of that 
kind.”18 
 
 12 Commission Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=EN. 
 13 Decision 2000/520, supra note 11, at ¶ 1.  
 14 Id. at ¶ 5.  
 15 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 650; see also Press 
Release, Statement on the Implementation of the Judgement of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union of 6 October 2015 in the Maximilian Schrems v Data Protection 
Commissioner case (C-362-14), Article 29 Working Party, (Oct. 16, 2015), 
https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/press-material/press-release/art29_press_
material/2015/20151016_wp29_statement_on_schrems_judgement.pdf.  
 16 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 650, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=169195&pageInd
ex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6785411. 
 17 Id. at ¶ 86. 
 18 Id. at ¶¶ 88, 89. 
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The ECJ did recognize that the term “adequate” does not equate to 
a requirement that the third country “ensure a level of protection 
identical to that guaranteed in the EU legal order.”19  Instead, an 
adequate level of protection sufficient to permit the transfer of personal 
data  
must be understood as requiring the third country in fact to 
ensure, by reason of its domestic law or its international 
commitments, a level of protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed 
within the European Union by virtue of Directive 95/46 read 
in the light of the Charter.20 
Even with this backdrop that the U.S. must not directly match those 
protections within the EU legal system, the ECJ still found that the Safe 
Harbor Provisions, coupled with the protections (or lack thereof) within 
the U.S. legal system, did not sufficiently provide an adequate level of 
protection for EU personal data transferred to the U.S. 
B.  The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield 
The Schrems I decision placed the continued transfer of personal 
data from the EU to the U.S. into a tailspin.  Both the EU Commission and 
the U.S. Department of Commerce were quick to respond.  
On July 12, 2016, the EU Commission adopted Decision (EU) 
2016/125021 finding that the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield provided adequate 
protection for the transfer of personal data from the EU to the U.S.  In its 
Decision, the EU Commission explained that: 
The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield is based on a system of 
self-certification by which U.S. organisations commit to a set 
of privacy principles—the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework 
Principles, including the Supplemental Principles (hereinafter 
together: ‘the Principles’)—issued by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce and contained in Annex II to this decision.  It 
applies to both controllers and processors (agents), with the 
specificity that processors must be contractually bound to act 
only on instructions from the EU controller and assist the 
 
 19 Id. at ¶ 73.  
 20 Id. 
 21 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 Pursuant to 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of 
the Protection Provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016D1250&from=EN 
[hereinafter Decision 2016/1250]. 
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latter in responding to individuals exercising their rights 
under the Principles.22 
Further, the EU Commission specifically found that “[t]he 
protection afforded to personal data by the Privacy Shield applies to any 
EU data subject whose personal data have been transferred from the 
Union to organisations in the U.S. that have self-certified their 
adherence to the Principles with the Department of Commerce.”23  As it 
relates to the provision of individual remedies, the EU Commission 
found that the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield “provides data subjects with a 
number of possibilities to enforce their rights, lodge complaints 
regarding non-compliance by U.S. self-certified companies[,] and to 
have their complaints resolved, if necessary by a decision providing an 
effective remedy.”24 
Highly relevant to the subsequent judgment in Schrems II, the EU 
Commission specifically assessed the access and use of any personal 
data transferred to the U.S. by U.S. Public Authorities.25  Relying on 
specific “representations and commitments” made by the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the EU Commission ultimately 
held that “the United States ensures an adequate level of protection for 
personal data transferred from the Union to self-certified organisations 
in the United States under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.”26  The EU 
Commission based this finding on the following core findings of U.S. law. 
First, Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28) imposes limitations 
on “signals intelligence” operations.  Specifically, “signals intelligence 
may be collected exclusively where there is a foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence purpose to support national and departmental 
missions, and not for any other purpose.”27  Further, these surveillance 
activities must be “as tailored as feasible,” and “bulk collection will only 
occur where targeted collection via the use of discriminants—i.e., an 
identifier associated with a specific target (such as the target’s e-mail 
address or phone number)—is not possible ‘due to technical or 
operational considerations.’”28  The EU Commission found that the 
assurances provided by the U.S. in relation to any surveillance collection 
 
 22 Id. at, ¶ 14.  
 23 Id. at ¶ 16. 
 24 Id. at ¶ 41. 
 25 Id. at § 3.  
 26 Id. at ¶ 136.  
 27 Decision 2016/1250, supra note 21, ¶ 70. 
 28 Id. at ¶¶ 71, 72. 
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of personal data “capture the essence of the principles of necessity and 
proportionality.”29 
Second, in its review of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) use of National 
Security Letters (NSL), the EU Commission found that “insofar as 
personal data to be transferred under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield are 
concerned, these authorities equally restrict interference by public 
authorities to targeted collection and access.”30  To the extent any 
surveillance activities are taken, those activities “consist[] entirely of 
targeting specific [non-U.S.] persons about whom an individualised 
determination has been made.”31 
Third, the EU Commission received express assurances from the 
U.S. government that the “U.S. Intelligence Community ‘does not engage 
in indiscriminate surveillance of anyone, including ordinary European 
citizens.’”32  Further, the EU Commission found that the U.S. assurances 
were “supported by empirical evidence which shows that access 
requests through NSL and under FISA, both individually and together, 
only concern a relatively small number of targets when compared to the 
overall flow of data on the internet.”33 
Fourth, the surveillance activities within the U.S. are “subject to 
various review and oversight mechanisms that fall within the three 
branches of the State,”34 providing adequate oversight to any 
surveillance of EU personal data.  These oversight measures include 
“civil liberties or privacy officers, Inspector Generals, the ODNI Civil 
Liberties and Privacy Office, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board, and the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board.”35  And, these 
oversight activities are accompanied by “extensive reporting 
requirements” to address noncompliance, including Congressional 
reporting requirements.36  
Fifth, the EU Commission found that “[a] number of avenues are 
available under U.S. law to EU data subjects if they have concerns 
whether their personal data have been processed (collected, accessed, 
etc.) by U.S. Intelligence Community elements, and if so, whether the 
 
 29 Id. at ¶ 76. 
 30 Id. at ¶ 80. 
 31 Id. at ¶ 81. 
 32 Id. at ¶ 82. 
 33 Decision 2016/1250, supra note 21, at ¶ 82 (emphasis in original). 
 34 Id. at ¶ 92. 
 35 Id. at ¶ 95. 
 36 Id. at ¶¶ 101, 102. 
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limitations applicable in U.S. law have been complied with.”37  Judicial 
redress against both the agencies and the individual actors within the 
agencies, plus the opportunity to learn of surveillance through the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), combine to create sufficient 
safeguards for individuals to seek redress for any unlawful surveillance 
impacting their personal data.38  In addition, the U.S. made commitments 
to appoint an Ombudsperson to investigate and address any 
noncompliance with the Shield principles.39 
Based on its assessment of the current legal structure in the U.S., 
and assurances from the U.S. government, the EU Commission 
ultimately concluded that “the United States ensures effective legal 
protection against interferences by its intelligence authorities with the 
fundamental rights of the persons whose data are transferred from the 
Union to the United States under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.”40 
III.  THE ECJ’S DECISION IN SCHREMS II 
In light of the holdings in Schrems I, Max Schrems, the plaintiff in 
both the Schrems I and Schrems II cases, reformulated his complaint to 
address Facebook’s continued use of the SCCs to transfer personal data 
from the EU to the U.S.  Again, the High Court of Ireland referred 
questions regarding the transfer of personal data from the EU to the U.S., 
specifically questioning the limitations of certain U.S. surveillance laws 
and the adequacy of the SCCs to ensure appropriate protections for 
personal data transferred.41  
In many ways, the Schrems II decision feels like a reformulation of 
the Schrems I decision.  First, the ECJ made clear that EU data protection 
regulations still apply both during and after the transfer of personal data 
from the EU to a third country.42  Further, the ECJ clarified that the future 
processing of the personal data for certain national security purposes 
does not negate the applicability of the GDPR to that personal data once 
transferred: 
The possibility that the personal data transferred between 
two economic operators for commercial purposes might 
undergo, at the time of the transfer or thereafter, processing 
 
 37 Id. at ¶ 111. 
 38 Id. at ¶¶ 113, 114. 
 39 Decision 2016/1250, supra note 21, at ¶¶ 117–22. 
 40 Id. at ¶ 123.  
 41 Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir., Ltd., 2020 E.C.R. 559, ¶ 68, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=228677&pageInd
ex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=380028. 
 42 Id. at ¶ 83. 
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for the purposes of public security, defence and State security 
by the authorities of that third country cannot remove that 
transfer from the scope of the GDPR.43 
Second, the ECJ turned to the continued validity of the Standard 
Contractual Clauses, and emphasized that “the provisions of Chapter V 
of the GDPR are intended to ensure the continuity of that high level of 
protection where personal data is transferred to a third country.”44  
Further, the GDPR provides that to the extent that a third country does 
not itself provide an adequate level of protection for personal data, then 
“the appropriate safeguards to be taken by the controller or processor 
. . . must ‘compensate for the lack of data protection in a third country’ 
in order to ‘ensure compliance with data protection requirements and 
the rights of the data subjects appropriate to processing within the 
Union.’”45 
The ECJ provided three factors to be used to assess whether a 
transfer under contractual clauses provides an adequate level of 
protection: “data subjects must be afforded appropriate safeguards, 
enforceable rights[,] and effective legal remedies.”46  Ultimately, 
whether transfers are permitted under EU law is determined by 
whether data subjects “are afforded a level of protection essentially 
equivalent to that guaranteed within the EU by that regulation, read in 
the light of the Charter.”47 
Applying these factors to the SCCs, the ECJ clarified that the SCCs 
are a general document, and do not apply or address any specific third 
country’s legal adequacy.48  Further, since the SCCs are a contractual 
agreement between two parties, the responsibility of confirming the 
adequacy of their use lies with the  
controller or processor to verify, on a case-by-case basis and, 
where appropriate, in collaboration with the recipient of the 
data, whether the law of the third country of destination 
ensures adequate protection, under EU law, of personal data 
transferred pursuant to standard data protection clauses, by 
providing, where necessary, additional safeguards to those 
offered by those clauses.49 
 
 43 Id. at ¶ 86. 
 44 Id. ¶ 93. 
 45 Id. ¶ 95 (citing GDPR, supra note 2, at Recital 108).  
 46 Id. ¶ 103. 
 47 Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir., Ltd., 2020 E.C.R. 559, at 
¶ 105. 
 48 Id. ¶ 133. 
 49 Id. ¶ 134. 
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As such, the obligation of confirming the valid use of the SCCs in the 
transfer of personal data from the EU to a third country is solely placed 
on the parties to the SCCs themselves.  The ECJ expressly directs “the 
controller established in the European Union and the recipient of 
personal data to satisfy themselves that the legislation of the third 
country of destination enables the recipient to comply with the standard 
data protection clauses in the annex to the SCC Decision.”50 
Third, the ECJ, somewhat on its own initiative, assessed the validity 
of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, ultimately holding that it was an invalid 
mechanism to transfer personal data under the GDPR.51  Initially, the ECJ 
recognized that similar to the Safe Harbor Decision, the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield provides primacy to U.S. national security, public interest, and 
law enforcement requirements over the principles laid down in the 
Privacy Shield.52  And, in order for that primacy to be valid under the 
GDPR, it must be proportionate and limited to what is strictly necessary 
to obtain goals associated with the personal data processing.  The ECJ 
states that 
in order to satisfy the requirement of proportionality 
according to which derogations from and limitations on the 
protection of personal data must apply only in so far as is 
strictly necessary, the legislation in question which entails the 
interference must lay down clear and precise rules governing 
the scope and application of the measure in question and 
imposing minimum safeguards, so that the persons whose 
data has been transferred have sufficient guarantees to 
protect effectively their personal data against the risk of 
abuse.  It must, in particular, indicate in what circumstances 
and under which conditions a measure providing for the 
processing of such data may be adopted, thereby ensuring that 
the interference is limited to what is strictly necessary.53 
As applied to the U.S. surveillance laws, the ECJ held that “Section 
702 of the FISA does not indicate any limitations on the power it confers 
to implement surveillance programmes for the purposes of foreign 
intelligence or the existence of guarantees for non-U.S. persons 
potentially targeted by those programmes.”54  Further, the ECJ held that  
PPD-28 does not grant data subjects actionable rights before 
the courts against the US authorities.  Therefore, the Privacy 
 
 50 Id. ¶ 141. 
 51 Id. ¶ 201. 
 52 Id. ¶ 164. 
 53 Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir., Ltd., 2020 E.C.R. 559, at 
¶ 176.  
 54 Id. ¶ 180. 
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Shield Decision cannot ensure a level of protection essentially 
equivalent to that arising from the Charter, contrary to the 
requirement in Article 45(2)(a) of the GDPR that a finding of 
equivalence depends, inter alia, on whether data subjects 
whose personal data are being transferred to the third 
country in question have effective and enforceable rights.55 
Ultimately, in invalidating the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, the ECJ held 
that “neither Section 702 of the FISA, nor EO 12333, read in conjunction 
with PPD-28, correlates to the minimum safeguards resulting, under EU 
law, from the principle of proportionality, with the consequence that the 
surveillance programs based on those provisions cannot be regarded as 
limited to what is strictly necessary.”56  
IV.  THE RESPONSE TO SCHREMS II 
The ECJ’s decision in Schrems II launched a grenade into an already 
tense and impactful area of the law.  With economic pressures to allow 
the continued exchange of personal data between the U.S. and the EU, 
both the U.S. and the EU immediately signaled a desire to address the 
concerns raised in Schrems II and work toward a solution. 
A.  The EU Response 
The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) and the European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the EU agencies charged with 
oversight of the GDPR, generally welcomed the decision as a 
reaffirmation of the need to protect personal data both within and 
outside of the EU.57  The EDPB expressly stated that  
EDPB intends to continue playing a constructive part in 
securing a transatlantic transfer of personal data that benefits 
EEA citizens and organisations and stands ready to provide 
the European Commission with assistance and guidance to 
help it build, together with the U.S., a new framework that fully 
complies with EU data protection law.58 
 
 55 Id. ¶ 181.  
 56 Id. ¶ 184. 
 57 Press Release, EDPS Statement Following the Court of Justice Ruling in Case C-
311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximilian Schrems 
(“Schrems II”), European Data Protection Supervisor, (July 17, 2020), 
https://edps.europa.eu/press-publications/press-news/press-releases/2020/edps-
statement-following-court-justice-ruling-case_en; Press Release, Statement on the 
Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment in Case C-311/18––Data Protection 
Commissioner v Facebook Ireland and Maximillian Schrems, Eur. Data Prot. Bd. (July 17, 
2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_statement_202007
17_cjeujudgmentc-311_18_en.pdf [hereinafter EDPB Statement].  
 58 EDPB Statement, supra note 57, at 2.   
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In an effort to provide clarity to the impact of the Schrems II 
decision, the EDPB provided a “Frequently Asked Questions” 
document,59 which addressed the many questions posed by supervisory 
authorities and businesses.  The EDPB clarified that the Schrems II 
decision was not limited in application only to transfers under the SCCs 
and the Privacy Shield: “the threshold set by the Court also applies to all 
appropriate safeguards under Article 46 GDPR used to transfer data 
from the EEA to any third country.”60  Further, the EDPB reiterated that 
as it relates to reviewing whether adequate safeguards are in place to 
permit the continued transfer of personal data, “it is the primary 
responsibility of the data exporter and the data importer to make this 
assessment, and to provide necessary supplementary measures.”61  
In supplemental Recommendations,62 the EDPB provided a 
“roadmap” and additional guidance on tools that controllers and 
processors can implement as supplementary measures to ensure 
adequate protections for transferred personal data.63  The EDPB 
explains that “‘supplementary measures’ are by definition 
supplementary to the safeguards the Article 46 GDPR transfer tool 
already provides.”64  Further, “supplementary measures may have a 
contractual, technical or organisational nature.  Combining diverse 
measures in a way that they support and build on each other may 
enhance the level of protection and may therefore contribute to 
reaching EU standards.”65  Examples of supplementary measures 
include encryption, pseudonymization, and split or multi-party 
processing.66 
Even in light of this guidance, the EU continues to assess the 
validity of cross-border data transfers under Schrems II.  Individual EU 
member states have also weighed in on this influential decision.  Within 
a week of the release of the ECJ’s decision, Member State Supervisory 
 
 59 See Frequently Asked Questions on the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Case C-311/18––Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd 
and Maximillian Schrems, EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD. (July 23, 2020), 
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/20200724_edpb_faqoncjeuc3111
8_en.pdf.  
 60 Id. at 2.  
 61 Id. at 5.  
 62 See Recommendations 01/2020 on Measures that Supplement Transfer Tools to 
Ensure Compliance with the EU Level of Protection of Personal Data, EUR. DATA PROT. BD. 
(Nov. 10, 2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/consultation/edpb_
recommendations_202001_supplementarymeasurestransferstools_en.pdf.  
 63 Id. ¶ 6.  
 64 Id. ¶ 45. 
 65 Id. ¶ 47. 
 66 Id. at Annex 2.  
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Authorities began to weigh in with varying responses.  Certain Member 
States affirmed the ruling but pledged to work with companies to 
develop solutions to the invalidation of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.67  Yet 
other Member States, notably Germany and Ireland, called into question 
the continued transfer of personal data to the U.S.68  The Berlin 
Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information went so 
far as to advise companies to transfer all personal data to Europe and 
process only within Europe.69  
B.  The U.S. Response  
The U.S., like the EU, immediately issued responses to Schrems II.  
U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross issued a statement expressing 
that he was “disappointed” in the decision, but reiterated that the U.S. 
w[ould] remain in close contact with the European 
Commission and European Data Protection Board on this 
matter and hope[s] to be able to limit the negative 
consequences to the $7.1 trillion transatlantic economic 
relationship that is so vital to our respective citizens, 
companies, and governments.70 
Further, in September 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce, in 
conjunction with the Department of Justice and the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence issued a white paper, “Information on U.S. 
Privacy Safeguards Relevant to SCCs and Other EU Legal Bases for 
EU-U.S. Data Transfers after Schrems II”.71  The White Paper addressed 
 
 67 See, e.g., Updated ICO statement on the judgment of the European Court of Justice in 
the Schrems II case, INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE (July 20, 2020), https://ico.org.uk/about-the-
ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2020/07/updated-ico-statement-on-the-
judgment-of-the-european-court-of-justice-in-the-schrems-ii-case. 
 68 See, e.g., DPC statement on CJEU decision, DATA PROT. COMM’N (July 16, 2020), 
https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/news-media/press-releases/dpc-statement-cjeu-
decision (noting that the EJC “ruled that the SCCs transfer mechanism used to transfer 
data to countries worldwide is, in principle, valid, although it is clear that, in practice, 
the application of the SCCs transfer mechanism to transfers of personal data to the 
United States is now questionable”); Schwere Zeiten für den internationalen 
Datenaustausch, DPA HAMBURG (July 16, 2020), https://datenschutz-hamburg.de/
pressemitteilungen/2020/07/2020-07-16-eugh-schrems.  
 69 Nach „Schrems II“: Europa braucht digitale Eigenständigkeit, DPA BERLIN (July 17, 
2020), https://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/presse
mitteilungen/2020/20200717-PM-Nach_SchremsII_Digitale_Eigenstaendigkeit.pdf.  
 70 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce, U.S. Sec’y of Commerce Wilbur Ross 
Statement on Schrems II Ruling and the Importance of EU-U.S. Data Flows (July 16, 
2020), https://2017-2021.commerce.gov/index.php/news/press-releases/2020/07/
us-secretary-commerce-wilbur-ross-statement-schrems-ii-ruling-and.html.  
 71 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE ET AL., INFORMATION ON U.S. PRIVACY SAFEGUARDS RELEVANT TO 
SCCS AND OTHER EU LEGAL BASES FOR EU-U.S. DATA TRANSFERS AFTER SCHREMS II (2020), 
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three key areas.  First, many companies are not subject to laws that 
would permit the U.S. Intelligence Community to access the data 
collected and processed.72  Second, information collected by the 
Intelligence Community is often shared between the U.S. and the EU as 
part of diplomatic relations.73  Third, the U.S. legal framework maintains 
privacy protections that restrict governmental access to personal 
information.74  
The White Paper directly addressed two of the key sources relied 
on by the ECJ’s Schrems II decision: Executive Order 12333 (EO 12333) 
and Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA 
§ 702).75  First, the White Paper dismissed summarily the risks 
associated with EO 12333, which it stated relates to general surveillance 
matters and provides no specifics related to accessing personal 
information collected and stored by private companies.76  
Second, the White Paper provides analysis of FISA § 702, which 
permits the U.S. government to conduct targeted surveillance of 
non-U.S. citizens located outside of the U.S.77  Surveillance requests 
under FISA § 702 relate only to communications obtained via the 
assistance of an electronic communications service provider.  The White 
Paper highlighted that FISA § 720 establishes a judicial process 
regarding data acquisition for non-U.S. persons.  And “the overwhelming 
majority of companies have never received orders to disclose data 
under FISA § 702 and have never otherwise provided personal data to 
U.S. intelligence agencies.”78  
Further, before U.S. surveillance agencies can obtain information 
under FISA § 720, they must obtain approval from the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) and the surveillance agency 
must inform the service provider.79  The FISA Court ensures that U.S. 
surveillance is “targeted,” and limits the “purpose of the surveillance to 
a specified type of foreign surveillance.”80  Further, the White Paper 
 
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/SCCsWhitePaper
FORMATTEDFINAL508COMPLIANT.PDF [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].  
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 2. 
 76 WHITE PAPER, supra note 71, at 2.  
 77 Id. at 2. 
 78 Id.   
 79 Id. at 6–7.  
 80 Id. 
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makes clear that “[t]he government must record in every case the 
reasons a specific person was targeted.”81 
Continuing to highlight the deficiencies in the ECJ’s analysis, the 
White Paper infers that the ECJ took theoretical possibilities to be truths, 
which distorted the view of U.S. surveillance laws:  
The theoretical possibility that a U.S. intelligence agency could 
unilaterally access data being transferred from the EU without 
the company’s knowledge is no different than the theoretical 
possibility that other governments’ intelligence agencies, 
including those of EU Member States, or a private entity acting 
illicitly, might access the data.  Moreover, this theoretical 
possibility exists with respect to data held anywhere in the 
world, so the transfer of data from the EU to the United States 
in particular does not increase the risk of such unilateral 
access to EU citizens’ data.82 
The White Paper directly addresses a concern raised by the ECJ, 
“namely, whether U.S. law provides individual redress for violations of 
the FISA 702 program.”83  The White Paper outlined a number of redress 
mechanisms, including the FISA statute itself, which provides 
individuals with the ability to seek compensatory and punitive damages, 
and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which “provides a 
separate cause of action for compensatory damages and attorney’s fees 
against the government for willful violations of various FISA 
provisions.”84 
Finally, the White Paper outlined the measures taken since 2017, 
when Congress considered whether to reauthorize FISA.  Specifically, 
Congress removed the ability to seek communications “about” an 
individual, and instead limited communication collections to only those 
that are to or from the individual targeted by surveillance.  This change 
“reduces the potential for collection of personal data of EU (and other 
non-U.S.) citizens because their communications now may no longer be 
acquired under FISA 702 solely because a communication contains a 
reference to a lawfully tasked selector.”85 
Additionally, Congress passed amendments in 2018 that 
incorporated additional privacy protections into data collections under 
FISA § 702.  These amendments included annual certifications of more 
targeted data collection, increasing the agencies required to maintain a 
 
 81 Id. at 8.  
 82 Id. at 3.  
 83 WHITE PAPER, supra note 71, at 12. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 14.  
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Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer, and heightened reporting 
requirements.86  The White Paper encourages companies to be aware of, 
and use, these amendments to demonstrate that privacy protections are 
upheld for personal data transferred from the EU to the U.S.87 
Overall, the White Paper seeks to refute the ECJ’s conclusions 
regarding U.S. surveillance law.  In fact, the White Paper highlights that 
there are numerous protections within the U.S. legal system that the ECJ 
did not address in its decision: 
There are numerous other privacy safeguards in this area of 
U.S. law, not discussed by the ECJ in its review of Commission 
Decision 2016/1250 in Schrems II, that ensure that U.S. 
intelligence agencies’ access to data is based on clear and 
accessible legal rules, proportionate access to data for 
legitimate purposes, supervision of compliance with those 
rules through independent and multi-layered oversight, and 
effective remedies for violations of rights.88 
Ultimately, this response sought to provide clarity into the U.S. 
legal system and directly refute many assertions made in the ECJ 
decision and in lower court decisions related to U.S. surveillance law.  
V.  MOVING FORWARD: THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY WITH 
CROSS-BORDER DATA TRANSFERS 
Schrems I and Schrems II expose the challenges in applying one 
region’s legal framework to data that flows freely across borders and 
around the world.  The ECJ’s approach creates two inherent oppositions 
to explore, one practical and one legal.  On the practical side, the ECJ 
decision places a hard border on a borderless digital domain.  On the 
legal side, the ECJ decision attempts to apply EU law beyond its borders 
in a strong, extraterritorial manner.  Each is explored in turn below. 
The Internet, and technology in general, have benefited from years, 
if not decades, of uninhibited growth and development.  Many of the 
largest technology companies today (i.e., Apple, Google, and Facebook) 
sit in historically unregulated industries, or at most very lightly 
regulated.  Because companies have been free to collect data, including 
personal data, with few restrictions, these companies have built 
infrastructures that span borders and seamlessly move data between 
various regions on any given day.  
Ultimately, this decision, which is forcing companies to move data 
processing activities within the EU borders, could lead to the exclusion 
 
 86 Id.  
 87 Id. at 15. 
 88 Id. at 22. 
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of the EU from innovative services and new technologies.  In essence, 
the ECJ’s decision could become a nontariff barrier to trade that isolates 
the EU economy and hinders its global participation.89 
In addition, it is dangerous for one jurisdiction to opine on the 
application and breadth of another country’s legal infrastructure.  While 
there are certainly instances where a court or regulatory authority will 
address another jurisdiction’s law, it is generally accepted that the court 
will also accept the holdings and assertions made by that jurisdiction 
and will not conduct its own de novo review of the other jurisdiction’s 
law.90  
In Schrems II, the ECJ conducted a “cursory, and frequently 
unclear,” review of U.S. surveillance law, and used that review to 
invalidate an influential international agreement between two strong 
economic regions.91  This resulted in a lack of true clarity as to the ECJ’s 
real concerns with the continued transfer of personal data to the U.S.  
For example, “it is not apparent what aspects of section 702 expand 
collection beyond what is strictly necessary or lack minimum 
safeguards.  The court’s incomplete analysis therefore provides little 
guidance regarding the validity of current and future adequacy 
decisions.”92 
Further, because of the more macro-level review, the ECJ did not 
necessarily understand the global picture of surveillance law in the U.S. 
and the intended limitations on those laws that attempt to address 
privacy concerns.  By finding, in essence, that U.S. surveillance law and 
EU data protection requirements are per se incompatible, the ECJ failed 
to recognize areas where compatibility either already exists or could 
more easily be found between the two regions.  
The ECJ’s continual invalidation of the agreements between the EU 
Commission and the U.S. as it relates to personal data transfers appears 
to be driven by cursory reviews that do not include a deep dive into, or 
complete understanding, of the U.S. law at issue.  As such, the ECJ is 
creating an increasingly high burden for the EU Commission and the U.S. 
in order to facilitate the continued growth of mutually beneficial trade 
between the two regions.  
 
 89 Elisabeth Meddin, The Cost of Ensuring Privacy: How the General Data Protection 
Regulation Acts as a Barrier to Trade in Violation of Articles XVI and XVII of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, 35 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 997, 1017–18 (2020). 
 90 See, Andrew T. Guzman, Determining the Appropriate Standard of Review in WTO 
Disputes, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 46, 53 (2009).  
 91 Court of Justice of the European Union Invalidates the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield––Case 
C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., ECLI:EU:2020:559 (July 16, 2020), 
134 HARV. L. REV. 1567, 1571 (2021). 
 92 Id. 
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Additionally, the ECJ’s decision does not recognize that within EU 
law itself, there are exceptions for access to personal data by public 
authorities for national security, public interest, and police activities.  
The GDPR expressly recognizes these exceptions: “This Regulation does 
not apply to the processing of personal data . . . by competent authorities 
for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection[,] or 
prosecution of criminal offences[,] or the execution of criminal 
penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of 
threats to public security.”93  And, “[t]his Regulation does not apply to 
the processing of personal data by the Member States when carrying out 
activities in relation to the common foreign and security policy of the 
Union.”94 
As such, even under EU law, the activities outlined by the ECJ as 
incompatible with data protection requirements may, in fact, be 
conducted by EU Member States themselves.  The ECJ does rely on its 
conclusion that the U.S. surveillance laws are not “necessary and 
proportionate” to balance an adequate level of protection for personal 
data while permitting activities necessary for national security.95  Yet, 
the question remains if that is a true assessment of the complete legal 
infrastructure in the U.S. regarding the application of U.S. surveillance 
laws and whether the ECJ in the best position to make that assessment.  
In essence, the ECJ’s decision illustrates the dangers of one country 
opining on another country’s legal infrastructure.  This is, even more, 
the case here, where the ECJ made findings directly adverse to the 
assertions made by the U.S. government, both in response to Schrems II 
and in its discussions with the EU Commission in the drafting and 
adoption of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.  This leaves an awkward path for 
the EU and the U.S. to move forward: if the ECJ will not accept the current 
representations by the U.S. government, what will it accept?  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the ECJ’s decision in Schrems II highlights the challenges 
in creating regulatory and legal approaches that ensure that privacy 
protections are adequately upheld while also recognizing, and 
respecting, the law of different jurisdictions.  The ECJ has dominated the 
conversation, continually questioning the adequacy of protections 
provided by the U.S. legal system for EU personal data.  Yet, the ECJ may 
 
 93 GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 2.  
 94 Id. at art. 2. 
 95 Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir., Ltd., 2020 E.C.R. 559, ¶ 184, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=228677&pageInd
ex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=380028. 
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be overstretching itself by reviewing, and disregarding, interpretations 
of U.S. law beyond its own jurisdiction.  
It remains unclear where the EU and the U.S. will go from here.  A 
real question remains whether companies will be able to comply with 
the movement toward data localization requirements when 
infrastructures were built with the idea of the free flow of data.  
Compliance and the risk of noncompliance, however, do create a 
meaningful incentive to determine a path forward.  The EU and the U.S. 
represent two large economic powerhouses, and not finding a path 
forward to transfer personal data between these two regions is not an 
option. 
 
